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ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY
AS GROUNDS FOR NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE t
MARION JUSTIN REINHARDT*
GERARD J. ARELLA**

N THE PRESENT PAPER we are suggesting not only that a clinical
entity, known as essential incompatibility, can cause a marriage to
be null and void, but also that it can be verified factually to meet the
requirements of the canonical law of evidence.
We are going to try to demonstrate that there can be fixed personality structures which, relative to each other, make it impossible for two
parties to a marriage to enter a valid union. The invalidity is alleged to
be present because of incapacities on the part of both, relative to each
other, to fulfill one or more of the essential elements or terms of the
marriage contract. Invalidity is considered to result not from the personality structure of just one of the parties (or of both of the parties, considered separately) but precisely from the interaction of both parties
together-an interaction already basically present at the time of the
wedding which prevents them from being able to fulfill one or more of
the essential elements of the marriage contract.
We wish to emphasize very strongly that we are not examining the
area of matrimonial consent. We are not concerned with the ability or
lack of ability of either or both parties to place valid human consent to
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the marriage contract. In our discussion this
ability to consent is presumed to be both
possible and actual. The insight of the individuals is at least adequate; their freedom
of will is sufficient; and the maturity of
their judgment (if we wish for the sake of
clarity to distinguish it from the combined
action of intellect and will) is adequately
proportionate to the nature of the marriage
contract. In other words, "due discretion"
is present. We are not talking about the
"lack of due discretion."
We believe that an action based on "essential incompatibility" can be introduced,
pleaded, and a judgment issued without the
question of matrimonial consent or due discretion ever arising.
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE:
OBLIGE HIMSELF

"ONE CANNOT

To Do

THE

IMPOSSIBLE"

This basic principle, Nemo potest ad
impossible obligari, is not new in the history of law. As a matter of fact, it is Rule
6 of the Rules of Canon Law which are to
be found at the end of the Liber Sextus of
the Decretals of Boniface VIII. Cicognani
claims, although others deny, that the 88
Rules of Law of Boniface had the same
force of ecclesiastical law as the Decretals
which preceded them. 1 loannes Andreae
who wrote the glossa ordinaria to the
Rules demonstrated how this principle, that
one cannot bind himself to the impossible,
was well established in Roman Law.
In his glossa Ioannes Andreae explains the rule to mean that one cannot

1 A. CICOGNANI, CANON LAW 311 (1934).
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oblige himself to do something (1) which
is morally wrong, (2) which is legally forbidden or (3) which factually cannot be
accomplished, e.g., to touch the moon with
the finger or to transport a church from
Bologna to Paris. At least in regard to the
last examples of an impossibility, we wonder if Joannes Andreae would still be of the
same mind.
The Code of Canon Law makes no specific mention of this rule of law. It is, however, implied in various canons. Important
for our purposes is Canon 1086, the canon
on impotence. This canon has always been
interpreted as applying exclusively to an incapacity, generally physical but possibly
psychic, to perform the marital act of copulation.
Generally, moralists have agreed that
one could not oblige himself to do the impossible. It is particularly in the field of
moral theology that we are acquainted with
this principle. Moralists also agreed that
when something became impossible the
obligation ceased. They found no difficulty
in applying the principle not only to physical but also to moral impossibility.
We wish to reiterate and to emphasize
that one cannot be obliged to do the impossible. He cannot oblige himself to this
nor can he be obliged to it by another person. What a person cannot be thus bound
or obliged to, neither can he give a right to
another person (since, in the hypothesis, it
is actually "impossible"). Another way of
saying this is, that if a person cannot fulfill
a particular thing, then he cannot be bound
to it by another nor can he bind himself to
it (at least while it is impossible for him).
Therefore, if a person cannot fulfill an es-
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sential element of marriage, then, as a subject, as a person, for the duration of his
incapacity, he cannot contract marriage.
That is, at that time he is not the proper
subject of the marriage contract since he
cannot give or fulfill an essential requirement of the contract.
While Canon 1086 of the Code was generally considered to limit the concept of
impotence to an incapacity to copulate, it
appears that only in recent years was canonical jurisprudence ready to acknowledge
as invalidating a more general incapacity
to perform any of the other essentials of
the marriage contract. The first clear statement in reported cases of the more general
principle appears to have been made by
Sabattani in a case which involved a nymphomaniac. 2 Sabattani stated that if she
was incapable of fulfilling the essential
property of fidelity the marriage would be
invalid. The same principle of the invalidating effect of the incapacity to perform
an essential term of the marriage contract
was implied as "obiter dicta" by Heard '
and by Mattioli. 4 Pinna in 1963 seemed to
continue to restrict the concept of canonical impotence to an incapacity to perform
the marital act. 5 More recent Rotal decisions appear to accept it as established that
there can be a wider radical or constitutional incapacity, even of a psychic nature,
which causes invalidity. In a decision of
December 2, 1967 Lefebre declared that a
certain homosexual, the defendant in the

2

Much has already been written about
this more general constitutional incapacity
to marriage. Among the European authors
of special note are A. C. Jemolo and Peter
Huizing who are quoted by Lefebre in his
decision of December 2, 1967.7 In our
country, special credit must be given to
J. Richard Keating who applied the concept to a suggested solution of the case of
a sociopath. 8 With regret, it must be admitted that some writers continue to con-

49 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 503 (1957).

3 46 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 85 (1954).

49 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 774 (1957); 48 S.R.
Rotae Decisiones 873 (1956).
5 Monitor Ecclesiasticus 413 (1965).
4

action, was incapable of binding himself to
the essential obligations of permanency and
fidelity in the marriage contract with consequent nullity to the contract itself. 6 In an
unpublished review of the same action before the Rota, Pompedda on October 6,
1969 also found that this marriage of the
said homosexual was invalid because his
condition was opposed to the essential end
of the marriage, the procreation of children.
In this case there was no question of an
incapacity to consummate the marriage
physically nor was the case argued because
of the lack of consent based on an intention against the interests of children. Pompedda argued that no one is able to oblige
himself to do what he cannot do. Although
we do not at this time have the "in facto"
section of this decision, Pompedda can be
understood as saying that this particular
homosexual was incapable of giving the
real "ius ad prolem." Pompedda in this decision specifically states that there is a
more general incapacity to contract marriage than that found in Canon 1086.

6 Monitor Ecclesiasticus 473 (1968).
7 Id.
8 Keating, Sociopathic Personality, 25 THE JURIST 429 (1965).
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fuse this broader radical incapacity founded
in the personality structure with an inability to use "due discretion" which is necessary to give matrimonial consent. To distinguish the two, one can imagine a man,
physically impotent who is totally unaware
of his incapacitating condition. On the day
of his wedding his consent in all essentials
is equal to that of any other man entering
marriage. So too we say that there are persons whose personality structures, relative
to each other, are such that they cannot
fulfill the marriage contract but at the time
of the marriage they can be totally unaware
of their constitutional defects.
We believe that the axiom that one cannot oblige himself to the impossible is
sound and should be accepted as a basic
canonical principle of jurisprudence. St.
Thomas maintains that it is not fitting
(conveniens) to hold a person to a contract
which he is incapable to perform. 9 Our
Anglo-American common law states that
a promise imposes no duty if performance
of the promise is impossible because of
facts existing when the promise is made
and the promisor neither knows nor has
reason to know of the impossibility.'" For
the one who knowingly promises the impossible, a breach of contract suit offers a
remedy in common law for damages but
specific performance remains impossible.
The Decretals refused an action of nullity
to a plaintiff who knowingly entered marriage with a woman who was impotent, but
it regarded the marriage as invalid with

9 IV SENT., dist. 34, q. I, art. 2.

art. 2.
10

RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS

§ 456 (1932).
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the admonition to the parties to live as
brother and sister.
Assuming then that one should not be
held to a marriage contract when he was
incapable of fulfilling one or more of the
essential elements of the contract, we say
that there are individuals, considered solely
as individuals, whose rigid personality
problems or defects of the psychological or
moral order (in distinction to the purely
physical order) prevent them from being
able to assume one or more of the essential
elements of marriage. Such persons would
be considered, at least at that particular
time, incapable of contracting marriage
with any one because they are incapable,
at that particular time of fulfilling the essentials of the contract. (Possibly with extensive care or maybe even with the passage of time which normally brings its own
learning experiences and changes in personal growth such an individual might become truly capable of marriage.)
Some descriptive terms that have been
used for this ground for invalidity are (with
differences and limitations according to
various writers) "moral impotence," "radical incapacity," and "personal constitutional incapacity." The expression "psychic
impotence" has also been used but this is
confusing because this term for years has
been used by canonists to signify an incapacity caused by psychic factors to perform
properly the specific act of copulation. For
our purposes hereafter in this paper we will
use the expression ConstitutionalIncapacity
to signify this broader inability, based radically in the structure of the personality,
which makes it impossible for one to fulfill
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one or more of the essential terms of the
marriage contract.

sible spouses. This latter incapacity is
known as relative impotence and will be of
interest in our main thesis to be expounded.

PRESENT ESSENTIALS OF MARRIAGE

In accordance with the general principle
stated above, if one is unable to fulfill the
right to marital copulation, he cannot assume the obligation to it. This is evident
from Canon 1086 which accepted the notion that a personal defect, not one affecting the intellect or will (or consent as a
human act) does prevent a person from
being able to assume the essential obligation of marriage (and thus from being able
to give an essential right of marriage).
Therefore, says Canon 1086, the man who
is permanently (incurably) and absolutely
impotent cannot validly marry. Canon
1086 recognizes that invalidity can also
arise by nature when a specific couple is so
constituted physically or psychically that
they are unable to have marital relations
with each other, although they would be
able to have such relations with other pos-

One essential property of the basic marriage right is permanence. A possible example of the constitutional incapacity to
fulfill the essential property of permanence
could be the man who is gravely and deeply
homosexual. In a recent decision of October 6, 1969, written by Pompedda, the
Rota based its judgment of invalidity of
the fact that the man in question was incapable of giving and accepting the "ius in
corpus" such as is required by natural law.
The phraseology of this decision could also
be used to explain our approach, namely
that the person himself is not the subject
of marriage because of a constitutional or
radical personal incapacity. This Rota decision says that the object of marriage in
the case was lacking, but adds that the
reason for this was that the one contracting
was "incapable of transferring and accepting." It also states that in this person there
was a "deorientation of the whole person"
and that in proving this and other such
cases one must be able to establish with
moral certitude the incapacity of the one
contracting, his incapacity to enter a valid
marriage. Following this reasoning, we
could add that should a person's constitution or radical orientation show a permanent inability to stay with any woman in
a continued social marital relationship,
then, at least theoretically, we could state
that he had a radical incapacity to fulfill
the essential property of permanence.

11 Canon 1013, § 2.
Canon 1081, § 2.

The other essential property of the basic
marriage right is fidelity or exclusiveness.
Following our general principle that one

CONTRACT

It is commonly held by canonists that the
essential object of the marriage contract is
the right to the basic ius in corpus to acts
suitable for the generation of children. In
addition, the law is clear that the essential
properties of ius in corpus are perma-

nence" and exclusiveness. 1 2 Therefore, if
one does not consentually give the full right

or eliminates from his consent these properties of permanence and exclusiveness,
then he is contracting invalidly.

12
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cannot oblige himself to the impossible, we
claim that one who is incapable of fidelity
is incapable of marriage. An example of
13
such a case is the decision of Sabattani.
Here the Rota stated, "When nymphomania reaches a stage of this kind (its most
serious and permanent stage) and there is
no way of curing it, it is not to be doubted
that the marriage is invalid. For the woman
so afflicted ought to be said to be incapable
of assuming the obligation of fidelity be'14
cause of her very constitutional make up."
In this connection, the decision of Mattiolil5 is also interesting. He speaks of persons who because of an illness are at times
affected mentally but who at other times
are quite well. This decision states that if
the specific illness is one which will definitely get worse as time goes on, then the
person suffering from it natura sua, by
his own nature, by nature itself, is unable
to fulfill, for example, a permanent contract. This decision also implies that there
can be a constitutional incapacity in the
individual for a valid marriage apart from
that individual's intellectual or volitional
ability to contract.1"
In all of these cases, we have an application of the principle-that no one can be
obliged to do what is for him impossible.
When the constitutional incapacity is in reference to the basic right of marriage or
either or both of its essential properties,
nullity results.
We are naturally so aware of the fact
that a subject for marriage is needed, i.e.,

13

49 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 503 (1957).

14

Id.

t5 48 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 873 (1956).
16

Id.
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persons get married, that we can tend to
overlook the fact that the persons attempting marriage must be "marriageable." So,
for example, the law need not state in an
explicit way that the subjects of marriage
must be a man and a woman. We can further say that the Code of Canon Law need
not explicitly state that the subject of marriage be a person basically capable, as an
individual, of living as a married person.
(We are here, for argument, limiting ourselves to the traditionally accepted essentials of marriage.)
Coming back to our line of reasoning,
the incapacity to assume and to give is a
result of the fact that the person cannot
fulfill what he wishes to assume and to give.
This inability to fulfill, which we call constitutional incapacity, is itself the result of
the radical constitutional and fairly permanent makeup of the person. Thus, it is this
personality, constituted as such, which permanently excludes (morally at least) such
fulfillment. Therefore we have no "subject"
of marriage, at least at the time in question. This considers nullity from the incapacity of just one of the parties. Our thesis
extends this concept by applying it to the
interrelationship of two particular persons.
THE CLINICAL FINDINGS OF EXPERTS

Let us first define the terms. According
to Dr. Walter J. Coville, a psychologist,
"essential incompatibility" is a radical incapacity so deeply rooted in the personality
structures of the married couple that it is
impossible for them to live a common life
together. Dr. Coville explains that this
deeply rooted incapacity is manifested by
a life long history of periodic or constant
maladjustment and/or by psychological test
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findings and this structural incapacity is
resistive to basic change by prolonged therapy even though there might be some improvement on the functioning level by such
therapy. This is the scientific definition of
psychologists and psychiatrists. We, as canonists, note in particular that essential incompatibility makes a common life impossible. Although some therapy might be
used, there is a basic continuance of the
maladjustment, making common life impossible at least in a realistic human sense.
The parties may continue to live under the
same roof, perhaps even in the same bed,
but as total strangers. Essential incompatibility could still be found under these circumstances.
To prove that "essential incompatibility"
does exist, let us quote from a number of
experts who have appeared in the capacity
of psychiatric experts before the Tribunal
of Brooklyn:
Dr. C. Joseph Chiarello, psychiatrist: There
are couples who have sufficient power of
discretion or maturity at the time of contracting marriage but who later in actual
living together find themselves essentially
incompatible and incapable of leading their
married lives together.
Dr. Dominick F. Chirico, psychiatrist:
There are couples who possess sufficient
power of discretion or maturity of judgment, but who, relative to each other, are
so essentially incompatible that they are incapable of leading a married life, incapable
of perpetuity, incapable of fidelity. However, they still may be able to accomplish
this with someone else.
Dr. Walter
are couples
powers and
with regard

J. Coville, psychologist: There
who have good discretionary
are capable of sane judgment
to the marriage contract. How-

ever, their basic nature involves psychopathology that contraindicates their ability
to maintain harmony, perpetuity or fidelity
in marriage.
Dr. William S. Davis, Jr., psychiatrist: In
answer to your question [Are there couples
where both parties would actually possess
sufficient power of discretion or maturity
of judgment but who, relative to each other
are so essentially incompatible that they
would be incapable of leading a married
life, incapable of perpetuity, or of fidelity?]
I feel that you are absolutely correct. On
the other hand, if such a marriage remains,
it is because both parties are equally ill
(from a psychopathological point of view).
Either the personalities complement what
is lacking in the other or they play into
each other in a sort of double bond parasitic way. For them it is a game. This marriage would never terminate. Unhappy they
would be together but equally unhappy
they would be apart. An example of this
type of situation would be two sado-masochistic characters. If by chance one of the
persons is relatively healthy, he or she
would not be able to tolerate the other.
They would be incompatible.
Dr. Edward F. Falsey, psychiatrist: It
would appear that there are instances in
which both parties are so essentially incompatible that they are incapable of leading a
married life, incapable of perpetuity and of
fidelity. It is conceivable that they could
marry other persons but could not marry
each other.
Dr. Frederic L. Gannon, psychiatrist: I
seriously doubt the individual parties possess sufficient power of discretion if it does
result in incompatibility . . . the issue of
incompatibility or inability to sustain a mature relationship rests on the level of psychological development of the parties involved.
Dr. Pasquale D. Lotesta, psychiatrist: There
are personalities that are incompatible in
that they are incapable of leading normal
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married life but in other areas do possess
sufficient power of discretion or maturity
of judgment. It is conceivable that they
could marry other persons and be compatible.
Dr. Leon Olinger, psychiatrist: Your second question involves the concept of 'essential incompatibility.' Do you mean by this,
basic, unchangeable and irrevocable incompatibility? If yes, I am not sure it exists.
Theoretically, individuals are capable of
modifying and changing this behavior. By
means of psychotherapy, adults can learn
to free themselves from the shackles of
childish, immature behavior patterns and
develop mature, more adult forms of functioning. Two people who are "incompatible" at one time largely because they meet
each other for immature or unhealthy neurotic reasons, may conceivably, through
treatment, learn that they would prefer
each other to any other. Similarly, people
who are dissatisfied in one relationship because of unfulfilled neurotic needs, are
likely to find themselves incompatible in
another relationship.
Dr. John B. Scanlan, psychiatrist: It is
conceivable that parties to an incompatible
marriage could validly marry other persons.
Dr. John Deuel Sullivan, psychiatrist: On
the whole, I have some pessimism about
the usefulness of the incompatibility thesis
as a basis for annulment. At the present
time it seems to me that it would have to
be more or less a post hoc argument. ...
Now we'll make some effort to be responsive to your questions. The first has to do
with people who have good discretion but
may actually be essentially incompatible to
each other in permanence and exclusivity.
It is conceivable that such people could
validly marry other persons but cannot get
along with each other. . . . It may very
well be that one or both lacked due discretion and capacity for permanency, exclusivity and prolixity, but it can still be that
people with individual psychopathology can
make satisfactory marriages. I agree that
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psychological testing and psychiatric evaluation has established incompatibility in at
least a few cases.
Dr. Francis C. Bauer, psychiatrist: There
is absolutely no doubt that the married
state permits a considerable amount of
neurotic interaction. In many instances,
states of adjustment, which could have been
reached in the single state, are not possible
because of the limits imposed by the contract regarding personal freedom. Accordingly, neurotic traits may impinge upon
one another, establishing an entirely new
dynamic. . . . If the neurotic traits of the
partners feed each other in the marriage,
they may continue to be sick but compatible and, indeed, may find mutual assistance. If the traits are not congruent however, the marriage is doomed to failure.
OUR THESIS: ESSENTIAL INCOMPATIBILITY
CAN CAUSE NULLITY

From the above we believe that one can
justifiably conclude that essential incompatibility does exist, that there are couples

who are incapable of living a common life
together, at least as psychiatrists consider

essential incompatibility and as they understand common life. We need not hold absolutely that our experts' use of "essential"

means precisely what we, as canonists,
mean by "essential" in the canonical sense

nor that their understanding of "common
life" is the same as our notion of "common
life." At least for the purpose of this paper,
we are going to restrict our canonical definition of "common life" to basic common
conjugal or marital life, i.e., the actual use
of marital intercourse. Nevertheless,

the

statements of the experts, including their
principles and their examples of possible
cases of "essential incompatibility" show
that they are convinced that there are cases
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of such basic, deep and broad incompatibility that we are certainly justified in saying that at least in some of these psychiatric
cases there would be present inability to
fulfill the canonically essential elements of
a valid marriage.
There is one exception to the conclusion
drawn above. This is the opinion of Dr.
Leon Olinger who states that he is not certain that "basic, unchangeable and irrevocable incompatibility exists." He believes
that two people who are incompatible at
one time may conceivably, through therapy,
come to the conclusion that they prefer to
remain with each other. However, the
question still remains as to how much therapy would be required in such a case.
Could the condition be considered "curable" and therefore not perpetual if it required extensive therapy over a number of
years? In some cases reported to our Tribunal psychotherapy was unsuccessful even
after periods of 10 and 20 years. Even accepting Dr. Olinger's example, we might
still find that the marriage is invalid.
Our thesis is that if essential incompatibility exists because of relative constitutional incapacity to lead a "common life,"
and if this relative constitutional incapacity
exists at the time of the marriage and is
incurable with a reasonable amount of therapy, the marriage is invalid. For canonical
purposes, a definition with which all might
agree at the present time, "common life" is
at least the ability to lead a conjugal life,
i.e., to engage in marital intercourse in a
human fashion. Experience shows that
when two people are essentially incompatible in the sense understood by psychologists and psychiatrists, there frequently
arises between them such a strong aversion

to each other that marital intercourse between them becomes impossible, again in
a human fashion, i.e., with due regard for
the dignity of the two persons as human
beings. Relative constitutional incapacity,
as we have described it, excludes any further possibility of the proper exercise of
the ius in corpus when the open antagonism eventually becomes evident to both
parties.
Under the conditions specified, because
two specific incompatible persons might be
incapable of maritally living together in a
permanent manner, they would be incapable at the time of the marriage of exchanging permanent rights to acts suitable for the
generation of children. Permanence or indissolubility is rendered impossible because
of the relative constitutional incapacity existing at the time of the marriage. At the
time of the marriage contract, the "two incompatibles" were incapable of giving to
each other and accepting from each other
permanent rights to marital acts because
already at the time of the contract they had
a relative constitutional incapacity to fulfill
those rights in a permanent manner. They
could not oblige themselves to do what
they were then and there incapable of doing-of living a permanent conjugal life
together-"until death do us part." Nemo
potest ad impossibile obligari.
Constituents of Proof
By analogy with the elements of proof
required to establish relative impotence according to Canon 1086, we state the following are required for proof:
1) Both parties to the marriage have a
radical constitutional personality defect.
The radical personality defect of each party,

16
although often serious, need not be as serious as when the alleged nullity is to be
based on the personality of only one party.
2) The defects must have been present
at the time of the marriage. Most frequently proof of this is not difficult because
personalities do not readily change, especially without therapy.
3) The defects-or better the resulting
personalities-in both parties, must be permanent (at least incurable with reasonable
means).
4) The two defective personality structures must interact or clash in such a way
that conjugal life (the required ius in corpus) becomes humanly impossible. If
eventually it is established that the ability
to love and to give mutual help and assistance are essential parts of the marriage
contract, it would be sufficient to establish
that the personalities clash in such a manner as to render love and mutual assistance
17
impossible.
The Proof
All of the experts who have advised us
are of one mind that if essential incompatibility exists, sufficient external criteria
should be available to satisfy the reasonable demands of the laws of evidence. They
do not agree in all details as to what these
external criteria should be. All agree that
psychological testing in depth of both parties by a competent psychologist is most
helpful; some say that such testing is necessary and should never be omitted; others
say that a thorough clinical evaluation of

17

See infra p. 183.
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both parties by a competent psychiatrist
would be sufficient in many cases. In this
regard an interesting question arises. Would
the clinical findings from the psychological
testing be considered sufficient proof? If
these give sufficient objective criteria,
should not the qualified psychologist be
considered an expert? We think he should
be. However, we also think that a psychiatrist, making use of the psychologist's findings and conclusions and integrating them
with facts supplied by witnesses and perhaps other documents, may at times be of
added assistance, especially in proving that
the condition antedated the marriage.
The fact that two parties to a marriage
have separated within a short time of their
marriage after much arguing, bickering,
etc., should be a sign for the canonical attorney that he might be dealing with a case
of essential incompatibility and that a further study in depth by professional men
might be helpful. Our experts have advised
us that there are no "easy" criteria to recognize essential incompatibility, but that
early sexual incompatibility, withdrawal of
the parties into themselves with the avoidance of social contacts, neglect of important family responsibilities might suggest to
the inexperienced that essential incompatibility might be present.
Examples of Essential Incompatibility
Certainly there are many cases of essential incompatibility where common life becomes impossible because of the very serious personality defect of only one of the
parties, e.g., schizophrenia, sociopathy,
nymphomania, satyriasis, chronic alcoholism, severe neuroses, etc. While all of these,
at least in their fully developed stages, are
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themselves considered grounds for nullity,
it might be (at least in some cases) that
the nullity is present precisely because these
conditions make common life impossible.
It might also be that in some cases essential incompatibility might be easier to prove
than the "lack of due discretion." Objective
criteria for due discretion are not always
easy to establish. In addition, some individuals might cooperate in an "incompatibility" action more readily than in an action where their own "due discretion" was
being questioned.
We have been advised by our experts
that generally two mature people are able
to adapt themselves to the minor differences which arise between them. Incompatibility results when one or both suffer
from personality defects, especially immaturity. Thus, it has been pointed out that
opposing trends, as an overly dependent
person with an overly aggressive person, or
an overly detached person with an overly
aggressive person, can result in incompatibility. Similar trends can also cause incompatibility as in the case of two aggressive
persons who compete and fight against
each other. In this case, the possession of
the same trait may antagonize the other.
In such cases, the differences between the
two people may be so great that there cannot be any bridging of the gap between
them.
Relation Between Essential
Incompatibility and the
Lack of Due Discretion
Where essential incompatibility is caused
primarily by such severe personality defects
as schizophrenia, manic-depressive psychosis, chronic alcoholism, severe neuroses,

etc., it is evident that the "lack of due discretion" might also be present and be provable. In the present paper, we have eliminated these grounds from our discussion,
deliberately restricting ourselves to a consideration of such marriages where the two
parties find themselves essentially incompatible but possibly could enter compatible
marriages with other spouses. Does the
very fact that two incompatible parties
marry necessarily indicate that one or both
of them lacked the necessary "due discretion" for a marriage? This remains a disputed question. Some experts claim that
two incompatible partners, both enjoying
due discretion, can make an honest mistake
in the choice of a partner. Others state that
in the case of essential incompatibility the
parties because of their immaturity have a
marked lack of understanding-blind spots
-with the result that neither can see the
other's position. Such lack of understanding is also present and affects the choice of
a mate. Does this eliminate the usefulness
of an action based on essential incompatibility? We think not. The standards of "due
discretion" used by the psychiatrist might
differ from those required by canonical jurisprudence. Secondly, essential incompatibility might be more easy to prove than
"lack of due discretion." In recent months
"lack of due discretion" cases have met increased disfavor in jurisprudence at the
Rota. There is always the possibility that
a case might have to face such an appeal.
Could the Concept of the
"Essential Elements" of
MarriageBe Broadened?
Before going into this particular question, we believe that, at least theoretically,
invalidity could result from relative consti-
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tutional incapacity because the persons
would not be capable of fulfilling an essential element of marriage-an element, that
is, which is recognized by all to be essential to marriage. In other words, to have
such grounds for invalidity, we do not feel
that the essential object of marriage necessarily must be enlarged. However, in analyzing possible cases of this nature (relative constitutional incapacity) we do observe that often it is evident that what are
termed the "secondary ends" of marriage
are certainly not being fulfilled. Consequently, a real question arises as to whether
the individuals taken together are even able
to fulfill these secondary ends. Therefore, it
seems appropriate to touch on this point
in considering the legal aspects of our present discussion.
A question then could be, is that list of
"essential" elements which limits itself to
the ius in corpus, to permanence and to
exclusiveness actually too limited? Should
one consider the "mutual help" of Canon
1013 as also essential to a real marriage?
Certainly this "end" of marriage is more
than of simply "great value" to marriage.
It is an end of marriage as marriage is
constituted by God and nature.
It seems that one of the reasons for our
problem is that we do not have in the Code
a precise definition of marriage. The Code
does, however, give some elements of a
definition.' 8 Yet, traditionally canonical
jurisprudence before the Code did have
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something of a definition-one accepted
from Roman Law. Justinian's definition of
marriage was: "Nuptiae autem, sive matrimonium, est viri et mulieries coninuctio,
individuam vitae consuetudinem conti-

nens."'19 In other words, marriage is a
union of a man and a woman that contains
within it an indivisable intimacy or way of
life. This was accepted by Gratian 20 and
by Pope Gregory IX.2I The definition implies that more than the ius in corpus is
part of the essential object of marriage. In
discussing the formal object of marriage,
there is an interesting sentence in one of
the Rota decisions previous to the Code
"objectum vero formale et essentiale huius
contractus, praeter mutuum vitae adiutorium, est potestas, seu ius . . .in corpus ad
coeundum."' 22 The formal and essential ob-

ject of this contract, besides mutual help
for life, is the power or right to normal
sexual acts.
When the Code speaks of the secondary
ends of marriage, it is not by calling them
"secondary" certainly and clearly saying
that they are not essential to marriage.
Therefore, one is led to ask whether if the
secondary ends, absolutely and permanently cannot be fulfilled by the parties,
would we have a real marriage? Is not mutual help something of a reflection of God's
judgment that "it is not good for man to be
alone." This was the reason for creating

1012, 1013, 1081, 1082 (especially Canon 1013 which deals with the ends and

19 THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, bk. 1, tit. 9,
line I (5th ed., J. Moyle transl. 1949).
20 Decretum in Gratiani, dictum ante c.1,
C.XXVII, q. 2.
21 Decretales Greg. IX, c.11, X, de presumpt.,
II, 23.

properties of marriage).

22 6 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 208 (1914).

18 See Canons
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woman to be man's "helpmate." But by
also giving woman to man as man's "wife,"
certainly did not mean that she would be
less his helpmate-rather she would be totally, more intimately and permanently such
a "helpmate." Whatever might be said on
this point by Scriptures scholars, certainly
in the factual order-in the order of
present human nature, the order which
marriage is now to take care of-mutual
help is undoubtedly more than of "additional" value.
For many years now the general need
for cohabitation and a community of bed
and board have been viewed to be only
required for the "integrity and perfection"
of conjugal life. The ius in corpus, was
the "essential" object of the contract. But
is the ius in corpus the only essential
object? When persons enter marriage they
contract for a life together-a marital life.
They intend to give and to accept an affection of life that is called marital-the affectio maritalis of Roman Law. This
affectio maritalis is a distinct thing-

very different from, for example, aflectio
concubinaria which in some basic way
pertains to the same material acts. It has a
more total aspect to it. Marital life, precisely as marital, means a community or
a society that will in a continued and exclusive way assist the two persons to fulfill their basic human needs and to develop
themselves as persons. Marriage then, considered as a state of life, requires from the
viewpoint of subject, a person capable of
living in this society of marriage. As was
said before, if a person cannot give consent (because of serious mental illness)
then he contracts invalidly because the

marriage, considered in its act of celebration (matrimonium in fieri) is defective.
But if a person cannot live out the society
that real marriage demands, then he is
incapable of "being married," of being
able to "create" the society of marriage,
of being one of the "necessary constituents" of a factual marriage (matrimonium
in facto esse). People marry to help themselves live a certain kind of good life.
Through marriage they should find assistance in bearing their problems, in developing their good points, in being able to
use their talents, assistance in facing difficulties that will normally arise in life, and
help in fulfilling their part in the raising
of children that might be born. If instead
of such assistance and help, constant and
across the board opposition is the normal
experience, then one of the real God-given
ends of marriage is impossible and whether
that end is secondary or primary (or
whether the two ends are equally important) it is still an end of marriage as
nature of God instituted marriage. A person does not intend to enter what might
be considered half a marriage contract.
They are accepting marriage as it is in
toto, as it is supposed to be in the practical order. Therefore, these persons, before anything else, should be able to so
accept and fulfill marriage.
Using other terms, marriage as classical
Roman Law considered it, is a domestic
union of a man and a woman. Specifically
as "domestic" it demands in a person at
least the capability of being such, namely
that one can function in such a way that
he can form, build up, establish a home,
"a domus" in its general and basic human
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aspects. If one deliberately does not do
this, that of course is an entirely different
question. Still he would be able to do it.
We feel that this idea is more than implied
by Canon 1082, which states that the
necessary "knowledge" for marriage is that
it is a permanent "society" between man
and woman. 23 Just as after puberty such
24
"knowledge" is presumed to be present,
so too, we might say it is presumed that
the individual after puberty is able basically to live out such a "society" as well.
Clearly this would broaden our possible
areas of invalidity. Going back for a moment, we see that as the ius in corpus
is essential (as are also the essential properties of that ius, namely perpetuity and
exclusiveness), then a person who is incapable of fulfilling some or all of these
aspects cannot contract validly. But what
if mutual help were also essential? Would
it not also follow that this essential element would have its own essential "properties" of individuality and permanence?
In this hypothesis the inability to fulfill this
end and/or the properties related to it
would also invalidate a marriage. Why?
Well, it appears to us that first it would
have to be shown that the secondary end
was also essential. For the moment, we
will accept the traditional distinction between primary and secondary ends since
the matter in question can be argued we
believe in that context and should the distinction be changed in the future, our
argument would be just as valid. There is

23
24

Canon 1082, § 1.
Canon 1082, § 2.

a statement in a 1938 Rotal decision
coram Jullien that holds just this. "'inis
vero primarius et secundarius uterque est
finis operis, seu finis matrimonii debitus,
essentialis, matrimonio intrinsecus.'' 25 In
other words, the secondary end of marriage is also an end of marriage itself
(finis operis) in distinction to an additional end of the one entering marriage
(finis operantis) and this end is not only
intrinsic to marriage but essential. It would
appear justifiable then to say that as there
is an essential object related to the primary
and essential end of marriage, so too there
is an essential object related to the secondary and essential end. The primary end
of marriage is children and the essential
object of the contract related to that end
is the "ius in corpus". If a person cannot
(e.g., because of impotence) fulfill this
essential object then he is not a proper
subject of marriage. The secondary end of
marriage is mutal help and we could say
that the essential object of the contract related to that end is the "right to a shared
life" (common life, in that sense) or the
''right to a sharing of each others lives."
Likewise, then if a person cannot (e.g.,
because of radical personality incapacity)
fulfill this other essential object, he would
not be a proper subject of marriage.
Admittedly it would be very difficultat least at first-to decide and to define
what are the essential constituents of "mutual help" or of a "shared life," but that
does not deny the value of trying to determine the constituents of these things as

25 30 S.R. Rotae Decisiones 344 (1938).
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well as the precise relationship of mutual
help to "essential object" of marriage.
Some statements in section 50 of the
Constitution, Gaudium et Spes of the Second Vatican Council seem to imply that
the marriage contract essentially obliges
the parties to mutual help and assistance
and to a common life. It will be noticed
that in the new rite for the sacrament of

marriage the parties explicitly promise to
love and honor each other. Should not
such an explicit promise be considered
26
part of the essence of the contract?
20 For a lengthy discussion by one who believes

that the essence of the marriage contract has not
been changed by Gaudium et Spes we refer to

Pio Fedele, the director of Ephemerides luris
Canonici. See 23 Ephemerides luris Canonici 50134 (1967).
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